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Abstract—There is a paradox in the model of social dynamics determined by voting in a stochastic
environment (the ViSE model) called “pit of losses.” It consists in the fact that a series of democratic
decisions may systematically lead the society to the states unacceptable for all the voters. The paper
examines how this paradox can be neutralized by the presence in society of a group that votes for
its benefit and can regulate the threshold of its claims. We obtain and analyze analytical results
characterizing the welfare of the whole society, the group, and the other participants as functions of
the said claims threshold.
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1. INTRODUCTION
It is known that decisions made by the majority of voters on the proposals generated by a stochastic
environment may systematically lead to situations unacceptable for all the voters. This voting paradox
(the “pit of losses” paradox) has been described in [1]. A natural approach to neutralizing this paradox
is increasing the majority threshold (i.e., the number of votes necessary to accept a proposal).
However, there is another approach that deserves consideration. Suppose that there is a “group” in
the society whose participants pursue group rather than individual interests. Moreover, the group has
a “claims threshold,” i.e., the minimum profitability of proposals the group considers acceptable for it.
Which group claims threshold is profitable (optimal) for the whole society, for the group and for the
other participants? In this paper, we give the answers to these and several other questions.
Consider the main features of the ViSE (Voting in Stochastic Environment) model [2]. Let society
consist of n members. ℓ members are egoists and g = n− ℓ are group members; therefore, δ = ℓ/n is
the proportion of egoists. The ViSE model extends the voting model introduced by A.V. Malishevsky
(see [3]), another extension of which is the well-known dynamic multidimensional voting model [4].
Each participant is characterized by the current value of his/her capital (an alternative interpretation
of it is utility). A proposal (of the environment) is a vector of proposed participants’ capital increments. In
the present paper, these increments are realizations of independent identically distributed normal random
variables. The parameters of the corresponding normal distribution N(µ, σ2) can be easily interpreted:
the cases of µ > 0, µ = 0, and µ < 0 correspond to a favorable, neutral, and unfavorable environment,
respectively; σ characterizes the scatter of the proposals.
In the basic version of the ViSE model, the only stochastic agent is the environment. The behavior
of the voters is deterministic in contrast to the random voting models [5]. An egoist votes for those and
only those proposals that increase his/her capital. All members of a group vote for the proposals that
are beneficial to this group and vote against the other proposals. The group can consider a proposal as
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a favorable one in the following cases: (a) the average increase (which can be zero, positive, or negative)
of a group member’s capital exceeds the chosen claims threshold t [6], or (b) the percentage of the group
members receiving positive capital increments exceeds some threshold. In this paper, we consider the
first case. The group supports those and only those proposals in which the average capital increment of
its members is greater2 than a selected threshold t. Let α ∈ [0, 1] be the strict relative majority threshold
for all votes of the society. If the proportion of the society supporting a proposal is greater than α,
then the proposal is accepted and then implemented. The implemented proposals constitute the voting
trajectory . The subject of our study is the statistical dependence of such trajectories (which express the
dynamics of social welfare) on the parameters of the model.
It should be noted that the behavior of the voters in the ViSE model corresponds to the Downsian
concept [8], more precisely, to its operationalization that is based on the comparison of the proposed state
with status quo [9]. Dynamic voting models have been studied in the theory of legislative bargaining [10],
where in some cases [11–13] stochastic generation of proposals has been assumed. In this type of models,
voters have “ideal states” that maximize their individual utility and the central problem is searching
for equilibrium. Such kind of problems are trivial or even pointless in the ViSE model because the
participants do not have finite ideal states. However, in this model, individual utilities (capitals) can be
naturally aggregated into group utilities3. This makes it possible to study collectivistic and altruistic
voting strategies. Because of this, the ViSE model gives the researcher a tool for studying cooperation
and egoism, which provides an alternative to the simple games (such as Prisoner’s Dilemma, Ultimatum,
Avatamsaka, Public Goods, etc.) traditionally used for these purposes.
The ViSE model allows one to identify a number of social phenomena, mechanisms, and relationships
associated with collective decisions. Their presence in practice (and degree) is a subject of special study.
The model also allows to test various approaches to bringing society to the desired or optimal state. Of
course, this model can not reflect all aspects of social reality, however, all its predictions are characterized
by mathematical transparency, therefore, the conditions for the manifestation of these phenomena are
amenable to verification.
As indicated above, the paper examines the social dynamics in the presence of a group with a claims
threshold. A moderate group of this kind can be interpreted as an elite.
We obtain the expressions for the mathematical expectations of egoists’ and group members’ capital
increments in the described society. These expressions are presented in Section 2. In Section 3, it is
shown that the group can choose such a claims threshold (it can be called optimal) that the expected
capital increment of the society is maximal. We provide a closed form expression for this threshold.
The dependence of the participants’ expected capital increments on the majority threshold is studied in
Section 4. The influence of choosing the optimal claims threshold on the size of the “pit of losses” is
examined in Section 5.
2. THE CAPITAL INCREMENTS OF EGOISTS AND GROUP MEMBERS
If the group does not support a proposal, then for its acceptance, the number of egoists’ votes cast
for it must exceed αn. Otherwise, if the group supports the proposal, then it is necessary and sufficient
that the egoists give more then
αn − g = αn − n+ ℓ = (α+ δ − 1)n
votes, i.e., the share (in the society) of the egoists supporting the proposal should exceed the value
γ = α+ δ − 1. (1)
2 This voting rule can be formulated in terms of the deterministic version of the model used in [7].
3 Such aggregation is natural because of the assumption of the transferability of utilities.
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Fig. 1. The expected one-step capital increments of a group member (1), an egoist (2), and a randomly selected
participant (3), where n = 100, ℓ = 50, µ = −1, σ = 10, and α = 0.5.
Proposition 1. The mathematical expectation of egoist’s capital increment d˜E in one voting step is
equal to
M(d˜E ) =
[
µ+(µ, σ, ℓ, γn) µ+(µ, σ, ℓ, αn)
] [P
Q
]
, (2)
where a row vector is multiplied by a column vector , µ+(µ, σ, ℓ, ℓ0) is the expectation of the normal voting
sample of size ℓ with parameters (µ, σ) and voting threshold ℓ0 [14], P = F
(
(µ−t)√g
σ
)
, Q = 1 − P, and
F (·) is the standard normal distribution function.
The proofs of all results are given in the Appendix.
Proposition 2. The mathematical expectation of a group member’s capital increment d˜G in one voting
step is equal to
M(d˜G) =
[
Fγn Fαn
](
µ
[
P
Q
]
+
σf√
g
[
1
−1
])
, (3)
where Fξ =
∑ℓ
x=[ξ]+1b(x | ℓ) ≈ F
(
− [ξ]+0.5−pℓ√
pqℓ
)
, b(x | ℓ) = (ℓ
x
)
pxqℓ−x is the binomial probability function,
p = F
(µ
σ
)
, q = 1− p, P and Q are defined in Proposition 1, f = f
(
(µ−t)√g
σ
)
, and f(·) is the standard
normal density.
Dependence of expected capital increments M(d˜E ) and M(d˜G) of the participants on the claims thresh-
old t are shown in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1 demonstrates that in a moderately unfavorable environment (µ/σ = −0.1), the group (half of
the society in the present case) has a maximum income at zero claims threshold t. However, the egoists
jointly lose more than the group wins, therefore, the expected capital increment of the whole society is
negative, and so the society is gradually losing welfare. If the group’s claims increase, then its income
decreases more slowly than the loss of egoists. When the claims threshold t is slightly higher than 0.2,
the expected capital increment of the whole society becomes positive. When t = 1, the expected capital
increment of the society reaches a maximum. A group with higher claims is blocking more and more
profitable proposals, and the expected capital increment of the society is decreasing to zero.
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Fig. 2. The expected one-step capital increments of an egoist (a), a group member (b), a randomly selected partici-
pant (c), and the difference between the expected capital increments of a group member and an egoist (d) as functions
of the adjusted claims threshold of the group t/σ and the proportion of the egoists δ, when n = 100, µ = −0.1, σ = 1,
and α = 0.5.
Fig. 3. The expected one-step capital increments of an egoist (a), a group member (b), a randomly selected participant
(c), and the difference between the expected capital increments of a group member and an egoist (d) as functions of
the adjusted claims threshold of the group t/σ and the proportion of the egoists δ, when n = 100, µ = 0.1, σ = 1,
and α = 0.5.
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Fig. 4. The expected one-step capital increments of an egoist (1), a group member (2), and a randomly selected
participant (3): sections of the surfaces in Fig. 2; n = 100, µ = −0.1, σ = 1, and α = 0.5.
Dependencies of the expected one-step capital increments of the participants on the adjusted claims
threshold of the group t/σ and the proportion of the egoists δ are presented in Figures 2 and 3 for the
cases of moderately unfavorable (µ/σ = −0.1) and favorable (µ/σ = 0.1) environments. Fig. 4 shows
the sections of the surfaces presented in Fig. 2. It allows to compare the capital increments of an egoist,
a group member, and a randomly selected participant. These dependencies are characterized by the
following regularities:
1. For µ < 0 and any proportion of the egoists, the average capital increment of an egoist monotonically
increases with the claims threshold of the group, because the number of accepted proposals that are
unprofitable for egoists decreases. The fastest growth of the capital increment is observed at t close
to µ;
2. When the proportion of egoists is small and the claims threshold of the group is low, the group accepts
many unfavorable proposals. This causes a fast loss of egoists’ welfare;
3. There is a maximum (with respect to the proportion δ of egoists) of the expected capital increment of
an egoist in the domain of sufficiently high group’s claims thresholds t and a high proportion of egoists
(δ > 0.9). For large t, this maximum exceeds the average capital increment in the society consisting of
egoists only. This is caused by the fact that a small group with a high t votes against most proposals.
Therefore, the proposals must have a high support from the egoists to be accepted. Such an actual
increase of the majority threshold for egoists (for the approvement of a proposal, 51 votes are needed,
but of 90–98 votes instead of 100) radically reduces the “pit of losses” [1], and the average capital
increment of egoists reaches the largest values;
4. According to Theorem 1 in [1], for the society consisting of egoists and the environment with the
parameters under consideration, the optimal majority threshold is α0 ≈ 0.52;
5. The group and the egoists lose welfare when the claims threshold and the proportion of egoists are
low. When t is close to µ, the expected capital increment of a group member increases rapidly with the
growth of the claims threshold. However, in contrast to the average capital increments of the egoists,
AUTOMATION AND REMOTE CONTROL Vol. 78 No. 6 2017
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for any proportion of the group, the expected capital increment of a group member has a maximum
at t = 0 (since this threshold optimizes the group benefit). This maximum takes the greatest value
when the group is small (cf. [15]);
6. In the domain of high thresholds t and the proportion of egoists δ > 0.9, the expected capital increment
of a group member has a minimum with respect to δ, which is lower than the corresponding value for
egoists. Thus, excessive claims of a small group worsen its position in comparison with the position
of egoists;
7. The expected capital increment of a group member is higher than that of an egoist everywhere, except
for the domains of very high and very low claims thresholds and small group sizes.
The expected capital increment of a randomly selected participant (surfaces (c) in Figures 2 and 3)
is expressed by the weighted average of the functions (a) and (b) with weights equal to the proportions
of egoists and the group, respectively. The surface (c) has a combination of properties of the averaged
surfaces. A randomly chosen participant loses capital when the group’s claims threshold is low and the
proportion of egoists is small. If the share of egoists is moderate, then the expected capital increment of
an average participant (and of the whole society) has a maximum with respect to t/σ; the corresponding
optimal group’s claims threshold is found in Section 3. The value of the maximum is higher for a larger
group. In comparison to the maximum for the group, this maximum is shifted to the domain of larger
t/σ, because if t/σ grows from the group’s optimum, then the expected capital increment of a group
member decreases slower than the expected capital increment of an egoist increases. This leads to the
growth of the expected capital increment of the whole society.
The established relationships allow us to draw the following conclusions.
The zero claims threshold is optimal for the group in any environment. It is advantageous for the
group to be relatively small (about 15 members out of 100 participants) in this case. In a moderately
unfavorable environment, such a group becomes richer, whereas egoists lose welfare.
In an unfavorable environment, the optimal group’s claims threshold is positive. The decrease of this
threshold from the optimum causes a faster loss for the society then the increase from the optimum.
In a favorable environment, on the contrary, the optimal group’s claims threshold is negative, and
the expected capital increment of the society decreases faster when the threshold is deviated from the
optimal value to the positive direction. This conclusion is analogous to the one of [1] saying that the
more favorable environment is encountered, the lower majority threshold is optimal.
3. OPTIMAL GROUP’S CLAIMS THRESHOLD
In this section, we obtain an analytical expression for the optimal threshold , i.e., for the group’s claims
threshold that maximizes the capital increment of the society. Let β be the ratio of the number of egoists
to the number of group members:
β =
ℓ
n− ℓ =
δ
1− δ .
Theorem 1. The expected one-step capital increment of the society reaches its maximum at the group’s
claims threshold
t0 =
β
Fγn − Fαn
(
µ+(µ, σ, ℓ, αn) − µ+(µ, σ, ℓ, γn)), (4)
where the notations is introduced in Section 1 and Propositions 1 and 2.
Let us find out how the optimal threshold t0 depends on the model parameters. Since γ < α (see (1)),
it follows from the definition of Fξ that Fγn − Fαn > 0 (and the smaller the share of the group 1 − δ,
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the smaller this difference); β is nonnegative. Consequently, the sign of t0 coincides with the sign of the
difference µ+(µ, σ, ℓ, αn) − µ+(µ, σ, ℓ, γn).
Fig. 5,a demonstrates the dependence of t0 on the proportion of egoists δ and the majority threshold α
for n = 100 and µ/σ = 0.1.
We note that for a large group, the absolute value of threshold t0 is small because the factors β and
(Fγn−Fαn)−1 are close to zero. The decrease of t0 with the increase of the majority threshold α becomes
faster with the growth of the number of egoists. The shape of this surface does not substantially depend
on the sign of µ.
Fig. 5,b shows the dependence of t0 on the proportion of egoists δ and the mean of the environment
proposals µ for n = 100, α = 0.5, and σ = 1.
The two surfaces in Fig. 5 have the same shape. When µ increases, t0 decreases and the smaller the
group is, the faster the change is.
Fig. 6 shows various sections of the surface presented in Fig. 5,a by the planes of fixed majority
thresholds. For α = 0.46, we have t0 ≈ 0; for the smaller α’s, the optimal claims threshold t0 is positive
and increases with δ; for the lager α’s, it is negative and decreases.
Corollary. If the votes of a group are sufficient to accept a proposal (α < 1− δ), then
t0 =
β
1− Fαn (µ
+(µ, σ, ℓ, αn) − µ).
If the votes of the egoists are insufficient to accept a proposal (δ 6 α), then
t0 = − β
Fγn
µ+(µ, σ, ℓ, γn).
If both of the above conditions are met (δ 6 α < 1− δ), then
t0 = −βµ.
In the latter case, the optimal group’s claims threshold t0 has an extremely simple expression. If the
number of votes necessary for a proposal to be accepted exceeds the number of egoists and does not
exceed the size of the group, then t0 is in the same ratio to (−µ) as the number of egoists to the number
of group members is, and the larger the group is, the closer to zero t0 is.
Fig. 5. Dependence of the optimal claims threshold t0 of the group on: (a) the proportion of egoists δ and the majority
threshold α for µ = 0.1, n = 100, and σ = 1; (b) the proportion of egoists δ and the mathematical expectation of the
proposals µ for α = 0.5, n = 100, and σ = 1.
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Fig. 6. Dependence of group’s optimal claims threshold t0 on the proportion of egoists δ for various majority thresholds
(α = 0.15 (1), α = 0.46 (2), α = 0.5 (3), α = 0.6 (4), and α = 0.9 (5)); n = 100, µ = 0.1, σ = 1.
4. DEPENDENCE OF CAPITAL INCREMENTS ON THE MAJORITY THRESHOLD
The expression of the optimal majority threshold for a society consisting of egoists has been obtained
in [1]. Now we consider the problem of optimizing the majority threshold α for the society that consists
of egoists and a group. Recall that the optimal threshold is the threshold that maximizes the increment
of the total capital of the society.
Using Propositions 1 and 2 consider the analytical dependencies of the expected capital increments
of an egoist, a group member, and a randomly selected participant on the majority threshold α and the
proportion of egoists δ in the moderately unfavorable environment (µ/σ = −0.1) for the zero group’s
claims threshold t.
The sections of the corresponding surfaces by the planes of equal egoists shares are shown in Fig. 7. If ℓ
is not very high, then sections (a) have two maxima with respect to α; the curves of maxima arguments
intersect at the point (δ = 1, α = α0), where α0 is the optimal majority threshold in the society consisting
of egoists. Consider the reasons for the appearance of these “ridges.”
We start with the relationship for egoists (Fig. 7,a). At a very low proportion of egoists and a low
majority threshold, an egoist has a high expected capital increment, because the probability of the event
that all the egoists are satisfied with a proposal is markedly different from zero, while their votes are
sufficient to accept such a proposal. Therefore, their expected one-step capital increment is comparable
in the absolute value to µ. When the majority threshold is higher than the proportion of egoists, then
they are unable to accept a proposal by their votes only, and their expected capital increment is much
lower. The second maximum is realized at the majority threshold close to 1. Its appearance is caused by
the following fact. When the adoption of a proposal requires both the votes of the group and the egoists
(i.e., overall, the egoists have a veto), then egoists’ influence on decision-making is quite noticeable, and
their interests are substantially taken into account. However, the support of the proposal by the group
is mandatory for the realization of this scenario, while with µ < 0, it does not happen very often, so this
maximum is much lower than the first one.
If the number of egoists increases, then both maxima still exist, but they shift to α0 (with a linear
dependence of their arguments on δ) and become lower. It can be simply explained. Here, one egoist
capable of accepting a proposal is replaced by a “clique” which less often provides the required number
of votes. The expected capital increment of a “clique” member (when the clique is satisfied with the
proposal) is lower than that of the above egoist due to the law of large numbers. The part of the curve
behind the second maximum lies somewhat lower, since an excessive majority threshold does not even
allow to accept proposals that are beneficial to both the group and most egoists.
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The dependence for the group (Fig. 7,b) has two “slopes” on the δ-sections. Between them, there is
a “plateau.” It shows that the majority threshold located between the maxima of the expected capital
increment of the egoists is quite beneficial for the group. Lower thresholds allow the egoists to ignore the
interest of the group, which reduces the group welfare. Excessive thresholds do not even allow to accept
highly profitable proposals. As can be expected, the “plateau” is higher when the proportion of egoists
is larger, because a smaller group has a greater benefit per participant.
Fig. 7,c depicts the expected capital increment of a randomly selected participant. As in the case of
the egoists, the corresponding surface in the coordinates α, δ has two “ridges.” When the proportion of
egoists δ is high, the surface of the expected capital increment of a randomly selected participant is close
to that of an egoist. The height of the maxima decrease as the number of egoists increases. At a low δ,
the surface of a randomly selected participant is close to the group surface and does not have high peaks.
Fig. 7,d shows the difference between the expected capital increments of a group member and an egoist.
This difference is positive except for the domain near the first “ridge” of the egoists’ surface, where they
win, because the egoists can “dictate their terms” in this case.
5. CLAIMS THRESHOLD ADJUSTMENT TO REDUCE THE “PIT OF LOSSES”
The group can reduce the size of the “pit of losses” (the area with negative expected capital increments
of the society) by choosing an optimal claims threshold. If the group has a sufficient size, then it can
Fig. 7. The expected one-step capital increments of an egoist (a), a group member (b), a randomly selected participant
(c), and the difference between the expected capital increments of a group member and an egoist (d) as functions
of the majority threshold α for n = 100, µ = −0.1, σ = 1, t = 0, and various proportions of egoists in the society
(δ = 0.02 (1), δ = 0.1 (2), δ = 0.15 (3), δ = 0.3 (4), δ = 0.5 (5), δ = 0.7 (6), and δ = 0.95 (7)).
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Fig. 8. The influence of adopting the optimal claims threshold on the presence of the “pit of losses” for n = 100.
(a) α = 0.4; (b) α = 0.5; (c) α = 0.6. The medium gray area is the area of the presence of “pit of losses” for t = 0,
the dark gray area corresponds to the optimal claims threshold t = t0.
Fig. 9. Dependence of the maximum proportion of egoists for which the choice of group’s optimal claims threshold
neutralizes the “pit of losses” on the majority threshold α. Gray points correspond to n = 100 (1), black points to
n = 10 (2).
completely remove the pit. Fig. 8 illustrates this possibility. In other words, a sufficiently large group can
help the society to overcome the paradoxical capital reduction caused by democratic decision-making. It
is important to note that a higher majority threshold allows a smaller group to do so. For example, if
µ/σ > −1, then for α = 0.4 the “pit of losses” does not appear for the societies with the proportion of
egoists up to 44%; for α = 0.5, up to 56%, and for α = 0.6, up to 83%.
Fig. 9 shows the dependence on α of the maximum share of egoists for which the choice of the optimal
group’s claims threshold t = t0 removes the “pit of losses.” This relationship is basically expressed by
the function y = x (after the correction taking into account the equivalence of majority thresholds that
determine the same winning coalitions).
Thus, it is established that the choice of the optimal group’s claims threshold can be considered as a
tool to neutralize the “pit of losses” paradox.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we considered the dependence of the group’s claims threshold that maximizes the capital
increment of the society on the parameters of the ViSE model for a society consisting of a group and
egoists. The absolute value of this threshold (called optimal) increases as the proportion of egoists
in the society grows. If the percentage of egoists is fixed, then the optimal group’s claims threshold
decreases with the grow of the majority threshold and becomes negative. Moreover, the optimal group’s
claims threshold decreases as the mean µ of the proposals grows. The latter relationship is essentially
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a counterpart of one of the conclusions of [1], which recommends increasing the majority threshold in
deteriorating environments and reducing it in improving environments.
We have shown that the choice of the optimum group’s claims threshold helps to neutralize the “pit of
losses” paradox in the societies consisting of a group and egoists. For a complete success, the proportion
of egoists should not exceed a certain value depending on the majority threshold. Thereby, an increase
of the majority threshold expands the zone of neutralization (by means of choosing the optimal group’s
claims threshold) of the “pit of losses” paradox.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1. Let G be the event that the group supports a proposal, G is the opposite
event, P = P (G), and Q = P (G) = 1− P.
When G occurs, it is necessary and sufficient for the proposal acceptance that egoists add more than
γn votes (case (a)). If the group votes against the proposal, then more than αn votes of egoists are
required to accept the proposal (case (b)). Since the average of the independent capital increments of
the group members is distributed as N
(
µ, σ
2
g
)
, the probabilities of events G and G are given by
P = F
(
(µ − t)√g
σ
)
and Q = 1− P = F
(
(t− µ)√g
σ
)
. (A.1)
Formulas for the expected capital increments of an egoist in cases (a) and (b) can be obtained using
Lemma on “normal voting samples” [14] and (A.1), which leads to the expression (2):
M(d˜E ) =M
(
d˜E |G
)
P (G) +M
(
d˜E |G
)
P (G)
= µ+(µ, σ, ℓ, γn)F
(
(µ − t)√g
σ
)
+ µ+(µ, σ, ℓ, αn)F
(
(t− µ)√g
σ
)
.
Proposition 1 is proved.
Proof of Proposition 2. Let Eξ be the event that the number of egoists’ votes cast for a proposal is
higher than ξ. Let
Fξ = P (Eξ). (A.2)
Then (see [6])
Fξ =
ℓ∑
x=[ξ]+1
b(x | ℓ) ≈ F
(
− [ξ] + 0.5− pℓ√
pqℓ
)
,
where p = F
(µ
σ
)
, q = F
(−µ
σ
)
, and b(x | ℓ) = (ℓ
x
)
pxqℓ−x.
Using the notation MP(A) = M
(
d˜G |A
)
P (A) we obtain
M
(
d˜G
)
=MP
(
G∧Eγn
)
+MP
(
G∧Eγn
)
+MP
(
G∧Eαn
)
+MP
(
G∧Eαn
)
(A.3)
=MP
(
G ∧ Eγn
)
+MP
(
G ∧ Eαn
)
,
since the second and fourth terms of the original expression are zero (as sunder the corresponding condi-
tions, the proposal is rejected and the participants’ capital does not change). Introducing the notation
t˜ =
(µ− t)√g
σ
(A.4)
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and using (A.1), (A.2), independence of the proposal components, the fact that d˜G is distributed as
N
(
µ, σ
2
g
)
, and formula (A.9) in [14] expressing M(ζ | ζ > t) for a normal ζ, we obtain:
MP
(
G∧Eγn
)
=M
(
d˜G |G∧Eγn
)
P (G∧Eγn) =M
(
d˜G |G
)
P (G)P (Eγn) (A.5)
=M
(
d˜G | d˜G > t
)
F
(
t˜
)
Fγn =
(
µ+
σf
(
t˜
)
√
gF
(
t˜
))F (t˜)Fγn
=
(
µP +
σf√
g
)
Fγn.
Similarly,
MP
(
G ∧ Eαn
)
=
(
µQ− σf√
g
)
Fαn. (A.6)
Substituting (A.5) and (A.6) into (A.3), we obtain (3). Proposition 2 is proved.
Proof of Theorem. The expected capital increment of a randomly selected participant is equal to
M(d˜) = δM(d˜E ) + (1− δ)M(d˜G). (A.7)
Using Propositions 1 and 2 and the notation (A.4) we now equate the derivative of the expression
(A.7) with respect to t to zero:
δ
[
µ+(µ, σ, ℓ, αn) − µ+(µ, σ, ℓ, γn)] f(t˜)√g
σ
+ (1− δ)(Fγn − Fαn)f(t˜)
√
g
σ
[
−µ+ σ√
g
t˜
]
= 0,
which implies
δ [µ+(µ, σ, ℓ, αn) − µ+(µ, σ, ℓ, γn)] − (1− δ)(Fγn − Fαn) t = 0, (A.8)
and consequently (4) takes place. Using (A.8), calculate the second derivative of (A.7) at t0 denoting by
t˜0 the result of substituting t0 into (A.4):
f ′(t˜0)
√
g
σ
(
δ
[
µ+(µ, σ, ℓ, αn) − µ+(µ, σ, ℓ, γn)] − (1− δ)(Fγn − Fαn) t0
])
+ f(t˜0)
√
g
σ
(1− δ)(Fαn − Fγn)
= f(t˜0)
√
g
σ
(1− δ)(Fαn − Fγn).
This expression is negative. Consequently, t0 is a point of maximum. Theorem is proved.
Proof of Corollary. If the first condition is satisfied, then γ < 0, consequently, Fγn = 1 and
µ+(µ, σ, ℓ, γn) = µ. If the second condition is true, then Fαn = µ
+(µ, σ, ℓ, αn) = 0. Substituting these
expressions into (4) we complete the proof of Corollary 3.
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